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Abstract—The large scale introduction of variable and limitedly 
predictable renewables requires flexible power system operation, 
enabled by, i.a., dynamic power plant operation, storage, demand 
response and enhanced interconnections. The fast start-up 
capabilities of combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) are crucial in 
this regard. However, these non-standard operating conditions 
significantly reduce the lifetime of critical turbine components, as 
reflected in long-term service agreements (LTSAs). This should 
also be reflected in short-term scheduling models. In light of this 
challenge, we apply a unit commitment model that allows multiple 
start-up loading modes while accounting for the corresponding 
turbine maintenance costs based on LTSAs. Leveraging this 
model, we investigated the need for fast start-up capabilities of a 
set of CCGTs as part of a small scale test system considering 
various shares of renewables and dynamic reserve requirements. 
We have found that fast starts are often cost-optimal despite their 
greater turbine maintenance costs and a cost reduction of around 
1 % is obtained when considering more costly fast start-up modes 
when scheduling. Furthermore, cost-optimal reserve sizing is a 
function of the planning frequency and is reduced by fast starting 
capabilities. We conclude that taking advantage of fast start-up 
capabilities benefits the electricity generation system and yields a 
significant cost reduction. 
 
Index Terms—Cycling, combined-cycle gas turbine, power 
generation maintenance, start-up modes, unit commitment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ind and solar electricity generation is highly variable and 
only limitedly predictable. Because of their low marginal 
generation costs, these renewable energy sources (RES) lower 
the residual load, to be met by thermal power plants. This is 
called the “merit order” effect [1]. Furthermore, the absence of 
a correlation between some RES, such as wind, and system load 
may cause larger variations in the residual demand profile. This 
requires thermal units to cycle more, i.e., changing the power 
output of power plants by starting up, shutting down or ramping 
up or down [2]. Moreover, the large-scale introduction of 
intermittent RES requires thermal units to operate more flexibly 
to follow the partly unpredictable residual load variations. 
Combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) play a significant role 
in power plant cycling as primarily this generation type serves 
as the marginal generation unit in most systems. The start-up 
loading rate is one of their most crucial parameters to flexibility. 
Faster start-ups offer flexibility that enables operators to exploit 
unforeseen opportunities in today’s limitedly predictable 
 
 
market conditions [3]. 
To draw conclusions on the value of operational flexibility 
based on unit commitment modeling, the technical limitations 
of generation units should be adequately represented. This is 
especially true for CCGTs as they possess the technical 
characteristics that allow flexible operation. Troy et al. [4] 
presented a formulation that allows CCGTs with a steam bypass 
stack to switch between open- and closed-cycle modes. 
Morales-España et al. [5] proposed a tight and compact 
configuration-based formulation to represent the possible 
configurations in which a CCGT can operate. Wogrin et al. [6] 
expanded on the work in [5] by allowing multiple operating 
modes in each CCGT configuration in an effort to accurately 
account for fatigue damage in the heat recovery steam generator 
depending on the operating strategy. To the best of our 
knowledge, only Wogrin et al. [6] have considered multiple 
start-up capabilities in a unit commitment model. However, the 
authors of [4]-[6] did not consider renewable power 
uncertainty, nor include associated reserve requirements. 
The cost of thermal power plant cycling is twofold. The cost 
of fuel and ancillary services is referred to as the short-term 
cycling cost and can be determined and accounted for via 
dedicated models. The thermal stress induced by cycling causes 
component damage over a longer time horizon, which results in 
maintenance costs [7]. Accurately representing these long-term 
maintenance costs in short-term operational decisions is an 
important challenge in unit commitment modeling. Troy et al. 
[8] implemented a dynamic, incrementing start cost that 
depends on the preceding scheduling decisions. Rodilla et al. 
[9] extended the work in [8] by making use of long-term service 
agreements (LTSAs) in the particular case of gas and steam 
turbines. An LTSA is a contract between the power plant 
manufacturer and the owner that guarantees the proper gas and 
steam turbine maintenance over an extended period on a “fixed-
price” basis. The maintenance frequency stipulated in an LTSA 
depends on the operating regime of the power plant, which can 
be used to calculate a so-called maintenance cost term. 
Non-standard operations such as fast starting induce 
significantly more thermal stress in critical components, 
leading to increased fatigue damage and a greater reduction of 
remaining lifetime. Consequently, fast starts require more 
frequent maintenance procedures than slow starts. This is 
reflected in maintenance criteria, for instance in [10], where fast 
starting is deemed to cause damage equivalent to two standard 
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starts in the hot gas-path of gas turbines. LTSAs also apply such 
a penalization for CCGTs [9], creating a trade-off between 
increased flexibility provided by greater start-up rates and more 
stringent maintenance criteria. However, in [9] it was assumed 
that CCGTs avoid the non-standard operations such as fast 
starts, even though these damaging events may occur regularly 
due to the increasing demand for flexible operation of thermal 
power plants [3]. 
In [11], the impact of varying the start-up rate and the 
corresponding turbine maintenance costs of CCGTs on their 
cycling regime was examined through a sensitivity analysis. In 
[12], a standard unit commitment formulation [13] was 
extended to allow multiple start-up loading modes while 
accounting for the appropriate turbine maintenance costs based 
on LTSAs. An exploratory case study in [12] investigated the 
need for start-up flexibility of CCGTs in the presence of a 
constant day-ahead overestimation of intermittent renewables 
and limited planning horizons by allowing a faster, but more 
costly, start-up mode. Fast start-ups were found to be optimal 
on many occasions, leading to a more cost-efficient operating 
strategy when considering fast start maintenance penalties. In 
this paper, we leverage the model in [12] and build on our 
previous work to contribute to the existing literature in the 
following three ways: 
1) An analytical derivation and a methodological illustration 
of the incentive for fast starting and its dependence on the 
forecast error and the cost of fast starting is presented. 
2) The planning frequency of the employed rolling horizon 
method is varied and its interaction with cost-optimal 
dynamic spinning reserve requirements and CCGT start-up 
decisions is analyzed in the presence of realistic wind and 
solar power forecasts. These forecasts are generated via a 
dedicated tool, leveraging historical forecast and 
measurement data, and reflect the accuracy of today’s 
forecasting tools. When reserve requirements are 
considered, the model employs a two-step scheduling 
approach in which the online/offline statuses of the 
generation units are determined in a commitment period, 
i.e. the period in which reserve requirements are enforced, 
some time ahead of their actual dispatch. 
3) Based on a realistic case study, specific maintenance costs 
of CCGTs are shown to be significant compared to their 
marginal generation costs. Simulation results illustrate the 
complex interplay between fast-starting capabilities of 
CCGT units, optimal spinning reserve requirements and 
the planning frequency. 
With respect to the application, this paper focusses on the 
operating strategies of a set of CCGTs as part of a small scale 
test system inspired by Spain, whereas [6] focused on the 
operations of a single CCGT, i.e., a self-commitment model. As 
such, a realistic case study investigating the impact of a slow 
and fast start-up mode on the operational regimes of CCGTs 
and operational cost components in the presence of renewable 
power forecast uncertainty, limited planning horizons, various 
planning frequencies and dynamic spinning reserve 
requirements is performed. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section II presents the 
developed methodology and the test system for the case study; 
Section III presents and discusses the simulation results; 
Section IV concludes. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
First, we present the modeling of start-up loading modes with 
the corresponding turbine maintenance costs in the unit 
commitment model. Second, the unit commitment model in 
[12] is summarized and the scheduling procedure and test 
system are described. 
A. Modeling the Turbine Maintenance Costs 
An LTSA prescribes the preemptive maintenance procedures 
that the manufacturer recommends to ensure the reliability of 
the equipment. By far the most expensive and essential 
maintenance procedure stipulated in LTSAs for CCGTs is the 
hot gas-path inspection, further referred to as the major 
overhaul, with an associated major overhaul cost (MOC) 
ranging of 20 to 60 million USD [9]. 
A maintenance interval function (MIF) is part of an LTSA and 
defines the combination of firing hours and starts that the plant 
may maximally accumulate between two major overhauls. The 
shape of the MIF depends on the manufacturer. Some 
commonly used shapes are discussed in [14]. This paper 
assumes a linear shape, as shown in Fig. 1. The maximum 
number of firing hours FHmax and starts Smax typically ranges 
from 8000 to 24000 h and 400 to 1200 starts, respectively [9]. 
As mentioned above, LTSAs penalize fast starts by assigning 
to them an equivalent number of slow starts, which increases 
the maintenance frequency. A unit that always starts fast will 
thus reach the MIF, hence incur the major overhaul cost, much 
sooner than a unit that avoids these non-standard operations. 
With a maintenance penalty α, the MIF for that unit will 
effectively be scaled down by this factor in the direction of 
starts. The major overhaul cost is assumed to be linearly 
dependent on the maximum generation capacity of the CCGT. 
Since the number of starts and firing hours required to trigger 
the maintenance procedure and incur the full major overhaul 
cost is generally not reached within one simulation period (e.g., 
4 weeks), only a fraction of the long-term maintenance cost 
should be allocated in the short-term unit commitment decision. 
The method to calculate and allocate this fraction, extensively 
described in [9],  and our adaptation to this method that 
 
Fig. 1.  The maintenance interval function for fast starting units dictates 
maintenance procedures after fewer starts than for slow starting units. 
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considers multiple start-up modes, extensively described in 
[12], is summarized below for the reader’s convenience. 
The major overhaul cost to be attributed in the simulation 
period mocUC is dependent on the operating regime in terms of 
accumulated starts sUC and firing hours fhUC. In Fig. 1, the 
dashed lines show the fraction (50% in Fig. 1) of the major 
overhaul cost to be allocated if they are crossed in the case of 
two different start modes (slow and fast). SA is the maximum 
number of starts in the slow start mode 𝑆𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥 and FHB 
represents the maximum number of firing hours FHmax. The 
appropriate maintenance cost can be calculated by summing 
mocuc in for each start mode l (total number  of start modes NL): 
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B. Unit Commitment Model Description 
The total operational cost consists of generation costs (i.e., 
fuel cost and short-term O&M costs), short-term start costs, and 
long-term maintenance costs (described in Subsection A). This 
yields the following objective function: 
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with NCi,t the no-load cost of unit i at time t in €/h, MCi the 
marginal cost of unit i in €/MWh, pi,t the power above minimum 
output delivered by unit i at time t in MW, STCi the short-term 
start cost of unit i in €/MW/start, 𝑃𝑖  the maximum output of unit 
i in MW and binary variables zi,t, vi,t and wi,t the on/off, start-up, 
and shut-down state of unit i at time step t. The number of starts 
in each mode l and the number of firing hours of each unit must 
be counted. The time resolution is one hour. Binary variable di,t,l 
equals 1 if start-up mode l is selected by unit i at time step t: 
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Equation (4) ensures that exactly one start-up mode is 
selected: 
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The upper generation limit for power plants is constrained by 
the upward spinning reserve 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
+ , by the start-up rate SUi,l after 
a start-up in mode l and by the shut-down rate SDi before a shut-
down: 
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The upward ramping limit (7) is also dependent on the start-
up mode and upward spinning reserve: 
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Finally, the market clearing constraint ensures the balance 
between supply and demand: 
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i
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With 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑡 and 𝑟𝑐𝑡  the infeed and curtailment of renewable 
power, respectively, and 𝑙𝑐𝑡 the load curtailment. The lower 
generation limits, downward ramping limits, minimum up and 
down time constraints, and binary logic constraints, of which a 
complete description can be found in [13], further constrain the 
solution. 
The boiler temperature dependence of the fuel-related start-
up costs is accounted for as in [15]. Hot, warm and cold starts 
are distinguished and it is assumed that a warm start occurs 
when the unit has been offline for at least 8 hours but no more 
than 50 hours [16]. Evidently, a start-up after less than 8 or more 
than 50 hours offline time will be hot or cold. 
C. Limited Planning Horizon and Renewables Uncertainty 
For each time step, it is assumed that the total demand and 
renewable power can be predicted only a limited number of 
hours in the future. A scheduling optimization is executed for 
this limited planning horizon. Fig. 2 illustrates this rolling 
horizon process. The planning horizon consists of a 
commitment period A, a dispatch period B and an overlap 
period C to ensure feasibility and continuity between 
optimizations. Only the solution for the dispatch period is 
retained. This solution provides the initial state for the next 
optimization, for which an updated forecast is made. If period 
A is only 1 hour, the commitment statuses can thus be changed 
up to the moment of dispatch (provided the minimum up and 
down times are respected) which we will refer to as “real time 
scheduling”. 
In “dispatch mode scheduling” the online/offline status of the 
generation units is determined in commitment period B some 
time ahead of the actual dispatch in A while subject to reserve 
requirements and forecast errors. In the dispatch period of the 
subsequent optimization, these commitment statuses are then 
fixed and only the power output and the selected start-up modes 
of the units can still be changed. During dispatch, reserve 
requirements and forecast errors are zero. 
To represent the limited predictability of intermittent RES, 
wind and solar generation scenarios that mimic real forecasts 
are generated by a forecast scenario generation tool. This data-
driven tool, based on the method developed in [17], allows us 
to generate a realistic wind and solar power forecast for look-
ahead times up to 48 hours. The scenario generation method 
samples from probability density functions of forecast errors, 
derived from a statistical analysis of wind and solar power 
forecasts and measurements in the Belgian power system, and 
 
Fig. 2.  The planning horizon consists of a commitment period A, a dispatch 
period B and an overlap period C. 
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the dependency of these distributions on the lead time of the 
forecast. Forecasts are generated as disturbances of the 
measured wind and solar power and thus reflect the current 
accuracy of wind and solar forecasting tools.  
D. Test System 
The unit commitment model is applied to a small scale test 
system inspired by Spain. Power plant generation is scheduled 
for a four-week period except when stated otherwise (for more 
exact results a two-month period is simulated in some cases). 
Table I provides an overview of the conventional power plant 
portfolio. The nuclear power plant is assumed to deliver at least 
95% of its maximum output when active. The ramping and 
shut-down rates of all units are assumed to be unrestricted, as 
the focus is on start-up rates. The fuel prices are 5.1 €/MWhe 
for uranium, 8.4 €/MWhth for coal and 27 €/MWhth for gas [18]. 
Short-term hot start costs and average ratios of short-term warm 
and cold start costs to short-term hot start costs for the different 
generation types were taken from [19], as well as minimum up 
and down times and part-load efficiencies. 
The CCGT units have two possible start-up loading modes, 
namely slow and fast. In this paper, we assume that the 
maximum number of starts and firing hours equal 1200 starts 
and 24000 firing hours respectively, that slow starts are the 
norm and that one fast start is equivalent to 1.5 slow starts. As 
a result, the maximum number of starts for a unit that always 
undergoes fast starts equals only 800 starts. Table II outlines the 
differences regarding the start-up rates and MIFs of the slow 
and fast modes. A major overhaul cost of € 40 million for a 400 
MW unit or 100,000 €/MW is assumed. 
The Belgian demand and renewable generation time series 
for 2013 were taken from ENTSO-E [20]. In that year, the wind 
and solar power penetration level was 6.42 % (solar: 2.85 % and 
wind: 3.57 %), and in the considered four-week period, it was 
8.18 % (solar: 5.07 % and wind: 3.11 %). Total Belgian demand 
equaled 85.6 TWh in 2013 and 6.2 TWh in the considered four-
week period. Simulations were run for varying wind and solar 
energy penetration rates by rescaling the time series (keeping 
the original ratio between them), within a range of 10–50 % 
relative to total demand in the simulation period. We did not 
consider any additional geographical smoothing that may occur 
at higher RES penetration rates. The RES curtailment cost was 
set at 0 €/MWh. The optimality tolerance was set at 0.1 %, 
except when explicitly stated otherwise. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In Section III-A, the incentives for fast starting are examined 
analytically. Then, we demonstrate the benefits of the 
developed methodology through a cost comparison. In Section 
III-B, the optimal planning horizon with real time scheduling is 
determined and the effects of limited planning horizons on 
scheduling and cost results are evaluated. In Section III-C, the 
interactions between cost-optimal reserve requirements, fast 
starts and the planning frequency are investigated. 
A. Fast starting analysis and cost benefits 
To demonstrate the impact of forecast errors on start-up 
decisions, an isolated, methodological CCGT scheduling 
illustration is presented in Fig. 3. Simulation results are shown 
without (Fig. 3(a)) and with (Fig. 3(b)) a forecast error at time 
step 3. We observe the differences in a situation at which a high 
ramping gradient must be satisfied by thermal generation units 
due to a sudden drop in renewable power. The output of 
identical 100 MW CCGTs that are started are shown during five 
time steps. In Fig. 3(a), the future residual load is fully known, 
and thus the model prepares for the high ramping gradient by 
slow starting both CCGTs one time-step in advance such that 
they can satisfy the ramping requirement by ramping up in the 
next time step. Note that in this illustration, renewable power is 
curtailed in order to start in advance. In Fig. 3(b), the model 
underestimates the ramping requirement in the next time-steps 
due to a positive forecast error. Therefore, it only schedules one 
CCGT to start up in the slow mode in time step 2. When the 
true residual load is revealed in the next time step, the model is 
forced to make a decision between starting two or more CCGTs 
in the slow mode and starting one CCGT in the fast mode. As 
we can see, the optimal decision is the latter, despite the greater 
turbine maintenance costs for fast starts. However, if the 
penalty for fast starting is increased (e.g., penalty α = 3), the 
optimal decision is to start two CCGTs in the slow mode, as 
shown in Fig. 3(c). 
This result can be explained as follows. Imagine that a 
generation portfolio of identical CCGTs must satisfy a 
challenging ramping requirement in the next time step. One or 
more units must be started if the online units cannot satisfy this 
increase with demand. The start-up ramping rate of two CCGTs 
TABLE I 
THERMAL GENERATION PORTFOLIO (SPP: STEAM POWER PLANT) 
Type 
# 
units 
Capacity 
[GW] 
η a [%] 
STC b 
[€/MW/start] 
SU c 
[%𝑃/h] 
Nuclear 1 1 33 6.5-12-23 100 
SPP-coal 11 3 40 40.5-61-74 43 
SPP-gas 4 1 36 27-45.5-58 50 
CCGT 14 5.4 48-58 26-37-74 35-100 
a The lowest and highest efficiencies are allocated to units commissioned 
or retrofitted before and after 2000, respectively. 
b Short-term start-up costs for hot, warm and cold starts are given, 
respectively. 
c Start-up rates for possible start modes are given. 
TABLE II 
PROPERTIES OF CCGT START MODES 
Start mode SU [%𝑃/h] Smax FHmax [h] 
Slow 35 1200 24000 
Fast 100 800 24000 
 
 
Fig. 3.  CCGT scheduling decisions (S: slow start, F: fast start) (a) without 
forecast error, (b) with forecast error  (and α = 1.5), (c) with forecast error and 
increased fast start maintenance penalty (α = 3). Total demand: thick line. 
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in the slow mode might suffice, but instead, the model may opt 
to start only one CCGT in the fast mode, if the following 
inequality holds: 
)(2 slowi
hot
i
fast
i
hot
i LTCSTCLTCSTC   (9) 
with 𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑖  the long-term start-up maintenance costs of unit i. If 
we define α to be the fast starting penalty, (9) can be reduced 
to: 
hot
i
slow
i STCLTC  )2(  (10) 
If the maintenance penalty α is smaller than 2, (10) always 
holds, and thus fast starting is optimal regardless of the short-
term costs. With the short-term costs of the test system, the 
turning point of α below which (10) holds and a fast start is 
optimal occurs at 𝛼 = 2.31 (assuming hot start-ups). The 
turbine maintenance costs caused by a fast start may maximally 
be 2.31 times greater than by a slow start before two slow starts 
are preferred (c). Note that this analysis concerns the optimal 
start-up decisions while only considering the hot short-term 
start-up costs. Other cost considerations such as the non-linear 
fuel cost function, minimum up and down times, and the part-
load efficiency drop slightly shift this turning point up to 2.55 
in this illustration (as determined by iteration). 
Cost results for the test system are compared in Table III to 
demonstrate the benefits of applying the developed 
methodology to allow multiple start-up modes and account for 
their corresponding turbine maintenance costs. Table III 
compares the results of a scenario with 28 % wind and solar 
power penetration for a two-month period and a 24 hours 
planning horizon in real time scheduling in the following cases: 
 Case W-PF, taking long-term maintenance costs 
into account when scheduling with perfect 
foresight, i.e. no forecast errors 
 Case W, taking long-term maintenance costs into 
account when scheduling with imperfect foresight 
 Case WO, not taking these into account when 
scheduling with imperfect foresight but adding 
them ex-post 
 Case S, where only slow starts are allowed, with 
imperfect foresight 
The cost differences between case W-PF and case W thus 
represent the balancing cost of wind and solar power, which 
amounts to 4.90 M€ (2.21 %). Note that in this case, all CCGT 
starts were in the slow mode as you can plan for ramping events 
(as in the methodological illustration in Fig. 3 (a)). Case WO 
shows the actual costs if the turbine maintenance cost penalties 
for fast start-ups would have been disregarded. Accounting for 
fast start maintenance penalties results in a different optimal 
operating strategy, leading to lower total costs. Compared to 
case W, the total operating costs for the two-month period are 
2.36 M€ (1.07 %) higher in case WO. Disregarding the turbine 
maintenance penalties leads to higher maintenance costs during 
planning (as calculated ex-post). The generation costs are 
slightly increased in case W, indicating a trade-off between the 
maintenance and generation costs. The CCGTs compromise a 
small amount on operating fuel-costs to save a greater amount 
on turbine maintenance costs. The total cycling costs, 
comprising short-term start costs and turbine maintenance 
costs, declines by 10.13 %. Finally, the total operational cost is 
again greater in case S. We observe lower turbine maintenance 
costs and slightly greater generation costs. The short-term start 
costs are greater, as more slow starts are required to provide the 
same system flexibility than when fast starting is an option. This 
indicates that taking advantage of both start-up modes results in 
more optimal scheduling decisions. 
B. Impact of renewables and planning horizon 
The impact of limited planning horizons on the scheduling 
results of a four-week period was investigated in real time 
scheduling. Fig. 4 shows the total operational cost and its 
components, as well as the total number of CCGT starts and the 
share of starts in the fast start mode. 
The generation units are forced to cycle more often with 
growing shares of renewables. As a result, total start-up costs 
increase. The CCGT start costs do not increase past 30 % 
renewables because fewer CCGTs are required to meet the 
residual load peaks, as shown by the number of CCGT starts. 
The turbine maintenance costs drop with increased wind and 
solar power penetration because the number of firing hours is 
greatly reduced, even though the number of CCGT starts 
increases up to 30 % renewables. As an increasing share of 
demand is supplied by renewables, the generation costs are 
reduced, hence the total operational costs reduce. 
To find the optimal planning horizon, optimizations were run 
for various scheduling periods B+C  (Fig. 2). We observed that 
the total operational costs decline until a planning horizon of 
around 24 hours. To investigate the impact of the planning 
horizon on the operational cost components and scheduling 
decisions, Fig. 4 presents the results for the optimal horizon of 
24 hours, a very short 4 hours horizon and an intermediate 12 
hours horizon. 
It is clear from Fig. 4 that in the presence of forecast errors 
and a limited planning horizon, fast starts are often preferred 
over slow starts, meaning they are optimal despite their greater 
turbine maintenance costs. As the share of intermittent 
renewables grows, this happens more frequently, ranging from 
4 to 20 % of total CCGT starts. 
The planning horizon length has a significant impact on the 
number of CCGT starts and total starts and their short-term 
costs, but the impact on the number of fast starts is negligible. 
Below 30 % renewables, the total number of CCGT starts is 
greatly reduced by longer planning horizons, whereas we 
observe the opposite effect above 30 % renewables, which is 
reflected in the CCGT start costs and turbine maintenance costs. 
TABLE III 
COST RESULTS FOR THE TEST SYSTEM  IN CASES W-PF, W, WO AND S. 
OPTIMALITY TOLERANCE: 0.01 %. 
 
Case W-PF 
M€; [%] 
Case W 
M€; [%] 
Case WO 
M€; [%] 
Case S 
M€; [%] 
Total 
operational cost 
217.06; 
[100] 
221.96; 
[100] 
224.00; 
[100] 
222.10; 
[100] 
Generation 
costs 
194.56; 
[89.64] 
195.29; 
[87.98] 
194.37; 
[86.78] 
195.70; 
[88.11] 
Short-term start 
costs 
8.85;  
[4.08] 
10.18; 
[4.59] 
10.03; 
[4.48] 
10.32; 
[4.65] 
Maintenance 
costs 
13.51; 
[6.23] 
16.35; 
[7.37] 
19.49; 
[8.70] 
15.95; 
[7.18] 
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The reason for this is that with a very short planning horizon, 
the model can only optimize costs in the short-term, meaning it 
will dispatch the generation units according to their position in 
the merit order instead of keeping some units with higher 
marginal cost online in short residual demand valleys to avoid 
future short-term and long-term start-up costs. At low 
renewables penetration rates, the residual load often exceeds the 
nuclear and steam power plant capacity, followed by relatively 
short periods of low demand. A very short planning horizon 
does not allow the model to see that the residual load will soon 
rise again, thus, some CCGTs are shut down and restarted only 
a few hours later, incurring considerable short-term and long-
term start costs. However, a longer planning horizon will keep 
some CCGTs online at part load to avoid these start-up costs, 
thus reducing the number of starts. In contrast, at high 
renewables penetration rates, the residual load is greatly 
reduced during daytime by solar power, causing all CCGTs to 
be shut down regardless of the planning horizon. Again, a long 
planning horizon allows the model to see that after sunset, some 
CCGTs will be required to restart. Therefore, to keep more 
CCGTs warm, some will then be preferred over the gas-fired 
steam power plants. However, the above mentioned effects 
cause the total number of starts per 100 firing hours to be greater 
for short planning horizons at low renewables and similar at 
high renewables. 
The total start costs increase greatly with a shorter planning 
horizon. The generation cost however, which is the greatest cost 
component, is around 1 % greater for the 4 hour planning 
horizon at any share of renewables. Adding these effects, we 
find that the total operational cost is around 0.8 – 2 % greater, 
depending on the share of renewables, for the 4 hours planning 
horizon with respect to the optimal horizon of (at least) 24 
hours. 
Fig. 4 also presents the turbine maintenance cost ranges of 
 
Fig. 4.  The total operational cost (a), the generation costs (b), the total short-term start costs (c), the CCGT short-term start costs, the turbine maintenance costs 
(d) and the specific turbine maintenance cost ranges for active CCGT units (24 h planning horizon) (f) obtained with real-time scheduling. The total (thick lines) 
and fast (thin lines) number of CCGT starts in absolute terms (g) and per 100 CCGT firing hours (h). Graphs are shown for three different planning horizons as 
a function of the overall solar and wind power penetration. Solar and wind power are considered in a fixed ratio of 1.63:1. 
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the active CCGT units as a cost metric in € per MW unit 
capacity 𝑃𝑖  per firing hour (€/MW/h), i.e., the specific turbine 
maintenance cost. This maintenance cost should be compared 
to the marginal generation cost of CCGTs of around 50 
€/MWhe. There is a cost increase with growing shares of 
renewables as a result of a decreasing number of firing hours 
while the number of starts increases and then stagnates. 
Furthermore, we clearly observe two separate ranges. The 
majority of the CCGTs are in the low range, for which the 
turbine maintenance costs increase from 6 to 16 €/MW/h. These 
units are relatively new (commissioned or retrofitted after 
2000) and have a greater efficiency than the older units (Table 
I). These older units make up the top range, for which the 
turbine maintenance costs increase from around 17 to 25 
€/MW/h. Aside from their lower efficiency, the older units in 
this simulation also have a lower capacity 𝑃𝑖 . Further analysis 
of these differences show that both smaller unit size and lower 
efficiency significantly impact the specific turbine maintenance 
cost. We observe that these units have the lowest firing hours to 
starts ratios, because they are being used as peaking units. Thus, 
the turbine maintenance costs resulting from a similar number 
of starts must be spread out over fewer firing hours. The impact 
of the efficiency can easily be explained by noting that more 
efficient units with the same operational flexibility will be 
lower in the merit order than those with a lower efficiency. 
C. Impact of Spinning Reserves and planning frequency 
As unexpected deviations from the forecasted renewable 
generation regularly occur, sufficient operational flexibility 
must be available in real time. Reserves can be scheduled to 
manage the limited wind and solar power predictability. A 
trade-off exists between the cost of scheduling reserves and the 
socio-economic cost of load shedding. Here, the impact of 
spinning reserve requirements on scheduling results is 
investigated with dispatch mode scheduling, while subject to 
wind and solar power uncertainty and limited planning 
horizons. We have assumed a 30% wind and solar power 
penetration and a load curtailment cost of 3000 €/MWh. Fig. 5 
shows the total operational cost and the number of fast CCGT 
starts in function of the spinning reserve requirements as a 
percentage of the forecasted wind and solar power with dispatch 
periods of 24, 12 and 4 hours. The results for real time 
scheduling are also shown. Period B+C (Fig. 2) is set to 24 
hours in all cases. 
With real time scheduling, the thermal units can maximally 
react to realizations of the limitedly predictable residual load 
before dispatch by adjusting their commitment statuses 
accordingly. Consequently, there is no load shedding even at 0 
% spinning reserves and increasing reserves merely increases 
the operational costs due to scheduling inefficiencies following 
from overly conservative reserves scheduling. 
With dispatch mode scheduling however, a trade-off between 
the cost of scheduling reserves and the cost of load shedding is 
apparent. The optimal reserve sizing is a function of the 
planning frequency (all else being equal). It reduces from 37.5 
% (24 h) to 20 % (4 h) while total operational costs decrease by 
3.2 M€. A reduction of the dispatch period allows the thermal 
units to better anticipate the residual load, thus lowering 
operational costs. 
We have found that at low levels of reserves, CCGT units 
regularly schedule a slow start in the commitment period, but 
then adjust this to a fast start in the dispatch period to cope with 
forecast errors. The number of fast starts decreases with 
increasing reserves until fast starting no longer occurs. The 
part-load operation of the units providing spinning reserves will 
cancel out the need for start-up flexibility when an 
overestimation of renewable power becomes apparent because 
these units will be able to cover the forecast error by ramping 
up. 
Note that the point where fast starts are no longer scheduled 
is reached beyond the optimal amount of spinning reserves. 
Therefore it is interesting to investigate the interaction between 
the optimal reserve sizing and the fast start capability of 
CCGTs. Indeed, it is evident from Table IV that both the 
optimal amount of reserves and the corresponding operational 
cost are increased when the fast starting mode is disabled (case 
S). The impact is most significant with a dispatch period of 12 
hours. Furthermore, we have observed that the operational cost 
increase in case (S) is yet more severe at zero reserves, with a 
cost difference of 5 % (4 h) to 7 % (24 h) compared to case (W). 
In summary, the fast starting capability can considerably reduce 
the cost-optimal reserve requirements and the operational costs 
at sub-optimal reserve requirements. 
TABLE IV 
OPTIMAL SPINNING RESERVES SIZING IN CASES W AND S 
Dispatch period (h) 
Case W Case S 
(%) (M€) (%); (M€) 
24 37.5 99.3 40 99.9 
12 27.5 97.2 37.5 98.6 
4 20 96.1 22.5 96.4 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Total operational cost (a) and number of fast CCGT starts (b) in 
function of spinning reserve requirement with dispatch periods of 24, 12 and 
4 hours and a total horizon of 48, 36 and 28 hours, respectively. The results 
for real time scheduling (horizon of 1 h + 24 h) are also shown. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The large-scale introduction of intermittent RES requires 
thermal units to operate more flexibly to follow the partly 
unpredictable residual load variations. Fast start-up capabilities 
of CCGT units are one of the most crucial ways to cope with 
this uncertainty. Here, a unit commitment model was set up that 
allows operators to take full advantage of the flexibility of their 
thermal power plants by allowing multiple start-up loading 
modes. Furthermore, the model accurately accounts for the 
corresponding turbine maintenance costs for CCGT units based 
on their LTSAs. This enables us to obtain the optimal dispatch 
schedule of a power plant portfolio when multiple start modes 
are allowed and their implications on maintenance costs are 
considered. Furthermore, a limited planning horizon was 
simulated by means of a rolling horizon approach in which the 
planning frequency was varied. The possibility to impose a 
period in which the commitment statuses are fixed prior to the 
actual dispatch of the unit was also included. The limited wind 
and solar power predictability was modeled by generating 
realistic forecast errors and updating the forecasts at every step 
of the rolling horizon process. Finally, dynamic spinning 
reserve requirements were imposed. 
First, an analytical derivation and a methodological 
illustration of the incentive for fast starting showed that, 
depending on the maintenance penalty, fast starts can be 
preferred over slow starts to cope with forecast errors. This was 
confirmed by analyzing the power plant schedules, indicating 
fast starts are often optimal despite their greater turbine 
maintenance costs. Second, a cost comparison has shown that 
an optimal operating strategy leading to a total cost reduction 
of around 1 % and a cycling cost reduction of around 10 % is 
obtained when accounting for fast start maintenance penalties 
when scheduling. Third, we have investigated the impact of a 
slow and a fast, but more costly, start-up mode on the 
scheduling decisions of CCGTs and operational cost 
components in the presence of intermittent renewable power 
and limited planning horizons. The turbine maintenance costs 
comprised around 8% of the total operational costs. Also, the 
specific turbine maintenance costs of CCGTs were found to be 
significant in comparison to their marginal generation costs. 
Furthermore, the modeling results showed that both smaller unit 
size and lower efficiency considerably increase their specific 
turbine maintenance cost. Regarding limited planning horizons, 
the total operational cost was noticeably greater (0.8 – 2 %) for 
the 4 hours planning horizon than for the optimal 24 hours 
horizon. Finally, the impact of a dynamic spinning reserve 
requirement on the scheduling results was investigated. We 
observed that the optimal reserve sizing is a function of the 
planning frequency and that the fast starting capability affects 
the cost-optimal reserve requirement and the operational costs. 
The results in this work demonstrate that increased CCGT 
start-up flexibility in the form of multiple start-up loading 
capabilities benefits the electricity generation system despite 
higher maintenance costs and that representing these 
capabilities in a unit commitment model can yield a significant 
cost reduction. Note that the start-up procedure prior to start-up 
loading (e.g. purging and synchronization) was not considered 
in this work. Future work will address the complete start-up 
lead time between decision making and actual start-up ramping 
of generation units and consider other common types of 
maintenance interval functions, more start-up modes and the 
sensitivity to the major overhaul cost. This may help power 
plant operators to gain more insight on the characteristics of 
LTSA contracts to better negotiate the terms of their LTSAs by 
allowing their CCGTs to cycle at lower costs. 
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